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Limited Loan Rate Differentiation and the Determination of Loan Terms in the 
Chinese Commercial Credit Market 
 
Abstract 
China has partially liberalized loan rate setting by the banks since 2004 but loan rates 
remain stubbornly within narrow bounds. We argue that competition in the loan 
market is signalled through the variation of loan deal terms and loan maturity rather 
than loan rates. We examine the determinants of loan deal conditions in terms of size 
and maturity. This paper focuses on the role of single firm-bank relationships in 
determining loan deal conditions. Commercial loan deal terms of listed companies are 
matched to provider banks over the period 1999-2012 and sub-sample estimation for 
the pre-2004 and post-2004 periods confirm change in the bank-firm-loan 
relationship. We find that single firm-bank relationships are associated with larger 
loan size and longer loan maturity in the pre-liberalization period but that this 
relationship has weakened in the liberalization period.  
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1. Introduction 
Up until the late 1990s, the primary function of the Chinese banking sector was to 
provide low-cost funds to state-owned-enterprises (SOEs). Since the reform process 
signalled by the Banking Law of 1995, the banking sector has been gradually 
evolving towards full commercialisation. This gradual process has involved 
recapitalisation, foreign strategic investment, reformed governance, modern methods 
of risk management and limited liberalisation of loan rate setting. Up until 2004 
lending rates were strictly controlled within a narrow range by the Peoples Bank of 
China (PBOC). The legacy of the policy of strict control of lending rates along with 
policy directed lending was the under-pricing of risk and the well-known history of 
China’s non-performing loans (NPLs). After 2004 the upper limit on interest rates 
were lifted and banks had the capability to risk price marginal lending. 
 However, in the main, banks have not taken advantage of this new-found freedom 
and loan rates have remained clustered around the benchmark rate set by the PBOC. 
The reasons for the homogeneity of Chinese bank behaviour are uncertain. Podpiera 
(2006) surmises that interest rate pricing may have been a low priority in an 
environment of abundant liquidity or the familiar arguments of adverse selection and 
adverse incentives associated with the credit rationing literature (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). In an environment of limited loan rate differentiation, the terms and conditions 
of the loan that make up the vector of non-interest price factors can be expected to 
reflect risk and market conditions. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of terms and conditions 
of the bank loans of listed companies in China covering a data span 1999-2012. It 
argues that competition in the loan market is signalled through the variation in loan 
terms rather than the loan rate. We examine the determinants of loan deal conditions 
in terms of size and maturity of a commercial loan. We focus on the role of single 
firm-bank relationships. We match commercial loan deal terms of listed companies to 
provider banks over the period 1999-2012 and conduct sub-sample estimation for the 
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pre-2004 and post-2004 periods. Controlling for firm, bank ownership and market 
characteristics, we find that single firm-bank relationships generate better loan 
covenant in terms of longer loan maturity, but a single firm-bank relationship is not 
associated with larger loan size, allowing for other factors. We also investigate the 
single firm-bank relationship in the context of the ownership status of the bank and 
the firm. We find that state-owned banks (SOBs) are associated with larger loan deals 
and longer maturity.  
To anticipate the rest of our results we find that firm size and its debt exposure 
provide strong effects on loan maturity and loan size. The larger the firm measured by 
assets, the larger loan size and maturity of loans. The greater the debt exposure, the 
lower the loan size and the longer the maturity. On the supply characteristics, SOBs 
and single firm-bank-relationships (SBRs) are associated with longer maturity loan 
terms but have no clear relationship to loan size. Our results also confirm the 
well-known bias in lending by SOBs. A parameter stability test shows that the 
firm-bank loan relationship changed after 2004. 
This paper is organised along the following lines. The next section presents a 
brief context of Chinese banking. The third section offers the literature review. The 
fourth section outlines a theoretical framework and the empirical model. The fifth 
section examines the data and discusses the empirical results. The final section 
concludes. 
2. The Chinese banking context 
The remarkable growth of the Chinese economy and the development of her banking 
system continue to generate both plaudits and scepticism in almost equal amounts1. 
The use of the banking system for policy lending had saddled it with inefficiency and 
a large non-performing loans problem. Privatisation of a sort occurred with the 
creation of the joint-stock banks alongside the big-four SOBs, but the reality is that 
                                                          
1For example Coase and Wang (2012) compared with Huang (2008). 
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government remains firmly in control2. Through the creation of asset management 
companies, the big four banks were recapitalised with the use of the dollar reserves 
prior to their listing. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial institutions could take a 
stake in selected Chinese banks. But, while control of individual Chinese banks 
remains out of reach for the foreign institution3, the pressure to reform management, 
consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and reduce unit costs has 
increased with greater foreign exposure. 
Studies of Chinese bank efficiency conclude that while large inefficiencies exist 
(Chen et al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2009), these inefficiencies are declining. The 
conventional finding is that the SOBs have a higher level of average inefficiency and 
a slower speed of inefficiency decline than the JSBs (Joint-stock commercial banks). 
Efficiency and performance is found to be related to risk management processes and 
the internal decision making of the banks, indicating a strong learning activity on the 
part of the banks to ‘up their game’ (Matthews, 2013). The listing of the big four 
banks in China is intended to improve management, governance, transparency and 
ultimately profit performance.  
 Despite clear improvements in performance and efficiency, the Chinese banking 
system remains dominated by the SOBs and its lending is largely directed to the 
SOEs. Firth et al. (2009) quote that despite the private sector accounts for 50% of the 
economy it is the recipient of only 7% of bank credit. The banking system is still 
constrained by political influence and directed lending. Anecdotal evidence provided 
by Dobson and Kashyap (2006) and quoted in Bailey et al. (2011) suggest that despite 
the substantial progress in reform, banks face considerable political pressure in their 
loan decisions. Yet the Chinese approach of gradualist reform continues at its pace. 
There has been limited reform of loan rate setting allowed by the Peoples Bank of 
                                                          
2The Joint Stock Banks, while not directly owned by the Chinese government are owned by SOEs 
and entities that are ultimately traced to SOEs or Provincial government.  
3There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single 
investor, except in the case of joint-venture banks. 
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China (PBOC) and previous limits to interest rate setting have been lifted. Table 1 
shows the evolution of the regulation of interest rates for commercial banks. 
Table 1: Regulation of lending rates for commercial banks 
Year Loans Regulation 
1996 All enterprises: 0.9 to 1.1 times the official benchmark rate 
1998 Small enterprises 0.9 to 1.2 times the benchmark rate 
 Medium and large enterprises 0.9 to 1.1 times the benchmark rate 
1999 Small and Medium enterprises 0.9 to 1.3 times the benchmark rate 
 Large enterprises 0.9 to 1.1 times the benchmark rate 
2004 All enterprises 0.9 to 1.7 
2004 October  Upper limit removed. Lower limit unchanged 
2012 June Lower limit changed as 0.7times the benchmark rate 
2013 June Lower limit removed. 
Source: PBOC. 
Both anecdotal evidence and evidence in Podpiera (2006) suggest that despite the 
liberalisation of lending rates most new loans were contracted at or below the PBOC 
benchmark rate. Evidence by He and Wang (2012) confirm that even in 2010, over 
80% of bank loans were contracted in the bounds 0.9-1.3 of the benchmark rate at a 
time when the benchmark rate was at its lowest since liberalisation. Based on the 
survey data of 2400 enterprises for 2003, He (2010) makes an empirical study on 
firm-bank relationship and loan price in China. The results show that the length of 
firm-bank relationship has no significant effect on loan interest rate. The implication 
is that a single firm-bank relationship will be reflected in other aspects of the loan 
contract rather than the interest rate. 
The origin of the practice of limited loan rate differentiation may be traced to 
custom and practice, goodwill, legal constraints (such as usury laws), and institutional 
rigidities. Theoretical explanations are based on asymmetric information 
resulting in adverse selection and adverse incentives (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model results in an interest rate effect that has not only 
a direct positive effect on the bank’s return but also an indirect negative effect. This 
negative effect comes in two forms. First, the interest rate charged affects the riskiness of 
the loan, which is the adverse selection effect. Second, the higher the rate of interest 
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charged, the greater the incentive is to take on riskier projects, which is the adverse 
incentive effect. While such explanations may explain limited loan rate differentiation 
post-2004 in Chinese banks, the structure and political economy of the banking system 
suggests that central direction remains a strong imperative for lending to SOEs on 
favourable terms (Zhang, 2013).  
Figure 1 shows that post-2004 after an initial widening, the variability of lending 
rates has degenerated. According to data from PBOC, around 80% of the loan rate are in 
the 0.9-1.3 times of benchmark interest rate range from 2004-2013, which shows that the 
loan rate are still limited even after the loan rate liberation in 2004. Even during the 
period from 2007-2011, the share of loans priced at 0.9-1.1 times the benchmark rate 
was 81.7%. 
Figure 1: Distribution of effective interest rate on loans. Source: PBOC database. 
There are several possible reasons for this. First, while the credit rationing 
arguments of Jaffe and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) can explain limited 
loan rate differentiation, but there is little suggestion that SOEs and listed companies in 
China face credit rationing (Zhang, 2013). Second, the banking market may have been 
trapped in a Nash equilibrium following deregulation, awaiting the market leader to be 
the first mover. Third, competition may have swiftly equalised lending rates.  
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With such limited loan rate differentiation between banks, the question arises 
how do banks compete if the rate of interest is not used to price risk as expected 
following liberalisation? In this paper we propose that banks compete using the 
maturity of a loan4 as a choice variable in determining loan contracts. But first, we 
review the scope of relationship banking in China and briefly introduce how banks 
manage risk by adjusting loan size and maturity. 
3. Literature review  
In the Chinese banking market, SOBs have a closer relationship with state-owned 
enterprises based on both political imperative and political connections. Research on 
the banking relationship with non-financial firms has been a growing area of 
endeavour in China. Relationship banking plays an important role in resolving 
information problems and the benefits from strong banking relationships have been 
shown in many empirical studies (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al. 2008). 
The opacity of business in China, and information asymmetry are viewed by some as 
the key impact variables that define the lending relationship (Cao et al., 2010;Chang 
et al., 2014). The level of transparency of a firm is an important factor in banking 
relationships, where it is argued that the relationship bank can exploit its 
informational advantage to ‘lock-in’ the relationship firm (Gopalan et al., 2011). The 
avoidance of lock-in by firms leads to the development of multiple bank relationships, 
and the decision between a single versus a multiple bank relationships is the outcome 
of a trade-off between better loan terms in a single firm-bank relationship and 
flexibility in the provision of other bank services in a multiple bank-firm relationship.  
However, banks face costs in collecting information from non-relationship firms, 
which make it even harder for opaque firms to secure external funds (Ziane, 2003). 
                                                          
4The term of a loan is determined after consultation between the lender and the borrower 
according to the borrower’s production or business cycle, repayment capability, and the lender’s 
ability to provide funds. The term of a loan shall be stated clearly in the lending contract. 
Generally, the term of a loan for one’s own account shall not exceed ten years. Loans with a term 
exceeding 10 years shall be reported to the People’s Bank of China for a record. (See Lending 
General Provisions (PBOC, 28.06. 1996)).  
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Hence, firms that lack transparency has a higher likelihood in maintaining a single 
banking relationship (Berger et al., 2008). In the China context, He (2005) argues that  
commercial banks and firms tend to keep closer relationships in order to communicate 
information and enhance the efficiency of credit financing. However, a closer banking 
relationship also gives rise to the risk of ‘lock-in’. Using the 2003 NSSBF (National 
Survey of Small Business Finances) data, Chen (2008) examines the impact of 
banking relationship maturity on the repeated loan availability and loan cost, and 
finds that the longer the bank-firm relationship the higher the cost of credit. Based on 
survey data of 1186 SMEs in China, He and Wang (2009) study the impact of 
bank-firm relationship on the growth of firms and find that the longer the maturity and 
the greater the number of lending relationships, the slower the growth of firms. 
The role of SOBs in national lending strategies is well-established in the literature. 
Sapienza (2004) uses information on individual loan contracts in Italy to study the 
effects of state ownership on bank lending behaviour, showing that SOBs charge 
lower interest rate and mostly favour large firms and firms located in depressed areas. 
The parallel with China is clear. Domestic growth was mainly promoted by state 
policy banks and SOBs. Foreign banks are also observed to have higher efficiency to 
domestic banks (Berger et al., 2009). However, as newcomers to the China’s banking 
market, foreign banks remain in a weak position in sustaining closer banking 
relationships (Yin and Matthews, 2016).  
Bank lending can also signal poor subsequent performance reflected in stock 
market performance. Using the Chinese listed firm’s data from 1999 to 2004, Bailey 
et al. (2011) conduct an event analysis and find that poor financial performance and 
high managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan, and bank 
loan approval predicts poor subsequent borrower performance. However, it can be 
argued as with all studies on China the rapid development of China’s banking market 
makes all such studies time dependent. Unlike the past when the banking system was 
wedded to the socialist plan, Chinese commercial banks, in recent years have focussed 
on credit quality when making lending decisions (Chang et al., 2014). The average 
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non-performing loan ratio of the major commercial banks in China decreased from 
17.9% in 2003 to 0.9% in 20125. Modern credit risk management methods and risk 
pricing since 2004 has become standard practice (He and Wang, 2012). Loan quality 
is an important factor in the lending decision. Banks have also reduced their loan 
exposure to individual enterprises and widened the loan portfolio to more firms to 
diversify their risk (Yin and Matthews, 2017).  
The key factors in the lending contract are the size of the loan, loan maturity, 
interest rate and collateral. While risk is typically managed through the risk premium 
and collateral, (Berger and Udell, 1995; Ferri and Messori, 2000; Lehmann et al., 
2004) in practice, banks also use the loan covenant to control default risk. Although 
few studies have focussed on how asymmetric information and borrower’s risk affects 
the loan covenant, limiting the loan size and varying the maturity are part of the kit 
bag of risk management tools (Strahan, 1999; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; 
Kirschenmann and Norden, 2012). 
Using Dealscan data from 1988 to 1998, Stranhan (1999) finds that firms with a 
higher cash flow ratio or higher profitability (high quality firms) tend to secure larger 
loan size, while low rated firms face restricted loan volumes. Banks may also share 
the risk with their competitors by limiting the loan amount, in which low quality firms 
are forced to seek more banks for additional credit (Ferri and Messori, 2000). 
Similarly, loan maturity is also part of the bank’s risk management strategy. The 
liquidity constraints banks facing make a higher frequency of short term loans. And 
short maturities are supplied to more risky firms (Diamond, 1991). Berger et al. (2005) 
also show that decreasing asymmetric information is associated with an increase in 
loan maturities. Larger firm secure longer loan maturity since they are more 
transparent6 and usually low risk (too big to fall7), while less mature firms and firm 
                                                          
5See China banking regulatory commission annual report (year 2003-2012). 
6large firms are usually more transparent than small firms (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Stephan 
et al., 2012) 
7See Detragiache et al. (2000) 
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owners with poor credit histories tend to get shorter loan maturity (Ortiz-Molina and 
Penas, 2008).  
4. A Simple Model 
In this section we set out a simple model of bank market behaviour based on 
asymmetric information and guanxi which is the traditional business culture in China.  
For the firm, the objective is to obtain finance at the best terms possible which 
includes the longest maturity and most favourable repayment plan. As cash flow is 
important in the early stages of investment, we argue that the success of the project is 
positive in the uninterrupted access to loanable funds for the longest possible 
duration. The firm needs to borrow a minimum amount of funds L, from the bank to 
realise the project. Higher levels of loanable funds are used to obtain higher returns 
from the project. Let y be the total return generated from the investment for a given 
maturity of the loan.  
Loan activity by the banks is highly regulated in China by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC)8. A guanxi relationship with the bank will help the 
firm to manoeuvre around the restrictive regulations to ensure a smooth flow of 
funding. We denote the intensity of the guanxi relationship as G and other exogenous 
factors like firms’ characteristics that may affect the return on the project as X. Let the 
probability of success of the investment be given by ρ and the probability density 
function be given by 𝑓(𝜌) that describes the distribution of returns of the project. 
We assume that the objective of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the borrowing 
firm is to maximise the expected cash flow E(C)over the maturity of the loan. 
 
                                                          
8Loans are categorised by purpose with regulated duration of loans. Loans for working capital are 
typically of one-year duration, loans for fixed asset investment will typically be for 1-3 years, 
loans for projects depend on the nature of the project but will have to satisfy a raft of regulations 
before the loan application and loans for M&A is less than a year. 
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𝐸(𝐶) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜌)𝑑𝜌
𝑢
0
[𝑦(𝐿, 𝐺, 𝑋)] − (1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝐿       𝜇 ≥ 1 
𝐸(𝐶) = ?̅?(𝐿, 𝐺, 𝑋) − (1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝐿    (1) 
The assumptions are that bank credit is used to finance inputs to production in the 
sense of Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The expected value of the return on the 
investment by the firm is ?̅?.An increase in the borrowing level, increases the return 
from the investment but with diminishing returns. So 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐿
> 0; 
𝜕2?̅?
𝜕𝐿2
< 0; but also 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐺
>
0; where u is the upper limit of the return on a successful investment, r is the fixed 
rate of interest, and μ = maturity of loan. An interior solution exists for (1) on the 
condition 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐿
> (1 + 𝑟)𝜇. 
    It can be shown that (1) yields an iso-cash flow function that can be interpreted 
as a demand for loanable funds that is positive in µ and L and responds with an 
increase in µ for an increase in guanxi intensity.  
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐿
=
[
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐿
−(1+𝑟)𝜇]
𝜇(1+𝑟)𝜇−1
> 0 and 
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐺
=
[
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐺
]
𝜇(1+𝑟)𝜇−1
> 0 
From the perspective of the bank, it trades off increased risk from committing the 
loan to a longer maturity against the greater value of the guanxi relation. Let the value 
function for the banks be Vb, the bank’s perception of the probability of success be φ, 
which is a function of the term of the loan (given by µ). The nature of asymmetric 
information is that while the borrower is aware of the objective probability of the 
success of the investment the bank has a subjective probability of repayment which 
declines with the length the maturity of the loan. The amount of the loan is L, 
collateral is a fraction 0 <σ< 1 of the loan, and the gain from the guanxi relation G is 
such that the fraction of collateral posted declines with the increase in its intensity, 
𝜎(𝐺). The bank’s subjective assessment of the risk of the project increases with the 
term of the loan so 𝜑′ =  
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝜇
< 0 and 𝜎𝐺 =  
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝐺
< 0. 
The value function of the bank is; 
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𝑉𝑏 = (1 + 𝑟)
𝜇𝜑(𝜇)𝐿 + (1 − 𝜑(𝜇))(𝜎(𝐺)𝐿)        (2) 
𝜕𝑉𝑏
𝜕𝜇
= 𝜇(1 + 𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿 + (1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝜑′𝐿 − 𝜑′(𝜎𝐿) = 0  
= 𝜇(1 + 𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿 + 𝜑′((1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝐿 − (𝜎𝐿)) = 0  (3) 
    Clearly the above expression cannot be zero unless the second term is negative, 
which holds by assumption of the collateral condition. Totally differentiating (2) and 
setting to zero to derive an iso-value function for the bank; 
𝑑(𝑉𝑏) = [𝜑′{(1 + 𝑟)
𝜇𝐿 − 𝜎𝐿} +  𝜇(1 + 𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿]𝑑𝜇 + [(1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝜑 + (1 − 𝜑)𝜎]𝑑𝐿
+ (1 − 𝜑)𝜎𝐺𝑑𝐺 = 0 
    The first term in the square brackets is positive for values of µ less than the FOC 
of (3). Since the second term in the square brackets is positive, this results in; 
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐿
= −
[(1+𝑟)𝜇𝜑+(1−𝜑)𝜎]
𝜑′ {(1+𝑟)𝜇𝐿−𝜎𝐿}+ 𝜇(1+𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐺
= −
(1−𝜑)𝜎𝐺
𝜑′ {(1+𝑟)𝜇𝐿−𝜎𝐿}+ 𝜇(1+𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿
> 0 
    Equilibrium in loan size and duration is described in figure 2 showing a guanxi 
effect on loan size and duration. The firm’s iso-cost function is shown by D1. The 
bank’s iso-value function is shown by S1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2：Guanxi effect in the loan market 
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D1 
µ 
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In this framework, the rate of interest r is not seen as a choice variable in determining 
equilibrium in the loan market. An increase in intensity of guanxi shifts the supply 
curve up to the right and the demand curve up to the left(as shown in figure 2). The 
loan duration rises. However, the effect on loan size is ambiguous, which needs 
further testing. We have no direct measure of intensity of guanxi, but we posit that a 
single bank relationship is more consistent with it than a multiple bank relationship. 
Hence, the first hypothesis is: 
H1: In China’s banking market, firms with a single bank relationship will get more 
favourable loan terms. 
 
Previous studies suggest that SOBs have a special relationship with SOEs in China 
(Berger et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2012). The mitigation of loan risk when banks offer 
more favourable loan terms to specific firms is examined by Dong et al. (2014) who 
find that SOBs are better in controlling the NPL ratio than other types of Chinese 
banks in practice. Lu et al. (2012) highlight the collateral requirement for the “related 
loan” in China. There is a high probability that SOBs use collateral to secure guanxi 
loans. The following hypothesis relates to the joint effect of guanxi and collateral on 
loan terms. 
H2: The joint effect of a single banking relationship and collateral issued by SOBs is 
positively linked to loan terms. 
 
Although traditionally SOBs have been more involved in guanxi lending (Yin and 
Matthews, 2017), they have gradually moved towards commercial principles when 
making lending decisions (Firth et al., 2009). Unlike the unlisted period when the 
SOBs followed the dictates of the socialist plan, they have increasingly focussed on 
credit quality when making lending decisions (Chang et al., 2014). Furthermore 
competition in China’s banking market has intensified, while the interest rate still 
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varies in a small range, which implies the lending behaviours of SOBs have changed 
only gradually. The above analysis suggests that the guanxi effect weakened in the 
loan liberalisation period. Hence out third hypothesis is: 
H3: Compared with the limited loan rate period, the benefits of a single banking 
relationship are weaker in the loan liberalisation period. 
 
Other control variables [X] are: the size of the firm – it is posited that banks would 
make credit more easily available to large firms than small ones according to the 
information asymmetric theory. Also larger firms tend to have more bargaining power, 
which can make them secure more favourable loan terms (Harhoff and Körting, 1998; 
Stephan et al., 2012); a vector of firm-bank characteristics (firm quality, firm age); 
negative demand side characteristics (debt/asset ratio); and bank ownership.  
The two functions Loan and Maturity are to be interpreted as reduced form 
specifications and therefore SUR (seeming uncorrelated regression) method is chosen 
to deal with the empirical model. The Breusch-Pagan test is used to check the 
significant positive relationship between Loan 9 and Maturity. The benchmark 
empirical equation is designed as follow: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡+𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                            (4) 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                         (5) 
In equation (4) and (5), 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙10 is a dummy variable, which distinguishes the loan 
                                                          
9Loan size was deflated by CPI. 
10Collateral includes guaranteed loans, mortgage loans, and hypothecated loans. 
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deal with or without collateral, 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 stands for real firm size11, firm age and Cash 
flowratio are denoted as firmage andCashflows respectively, and liquidity stands for 
debt/asset ratio. In order to solve the potential endogeneity problem the lagged values 
of Tasset, cashflows and liquidity are used. Bankownership is a dummy variable, 
which distinguishes state-owned banks and foreign banks with other banks 
respectively. Macro variables include banking market competition ratio and growth 
ratio of real GDP. The details of variable definition are listed in Table 2 as follows: 
 
Table 2: Definition of the variables 
Variables Definition Unit 
Deal terms 
Size of loan The amount of money of each loan contract CNY 
Maturity of loan The maturity of each loan contract Year 
Collateral Loan deal with collateral=1, otherwise=0 - 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm asset Annual total asset of firm CNY 
Firm age The age of firm Year 
Cash flow ratio Firm’s annual net cash flow over total asset % 
Liquidity Firm’s total current liabilities over total asset % 
Bank ownership   
State-owned Banks state-owned banks=1, otherwise=0 - 
Banking relationship   
Single Single banking relationship =1, otherwise=0 - 
Macro Terms 
Banking market competition 
ratio 
(HHI) 
The sum of the squares of the market shares (percentage of 
banks’ assets over the total assets of the entire banking 
sector) of the five largest banks. 
- 
Annual growth of GDP 
(GGDP) 
Annual growth ratio of real GDP % 
Industry 
Manufacturea 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. Manufacture 
industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Real estateb 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. Real estate 
industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Servicec 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. Service 
industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
aManufacture: Manufacture industry 
bReal estate: Real estate industry 
cServices: Wholesale, retail, trades hotels and catering services industry 
                                                          
11Firm size was deflated by CPI. 
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5. Data and Empirical Results 
5.1 Data 
This research has a data set assembled from the CSMAR (China Stock Market 
Financial Statements) database, which contains information on listed firms’ 
borrowing behaviour, their individual balance sheet and income statements. We 
conduct two sets of estimation. One set covers the period pre-2004 and the other is 
post-2004. The argument is that in the pre-2004 period when loan rate differentiation 
was even more limited, maturity of the loan played an even bigger part in defining the 
conditions of a loan. Specifically, we refer to the 1999–2004 period as “limited loan 
rate period”, and the 2005–2012 period as “the loan rate liberalisation period”. 
Data on 716 firms with 7140 lending relationship are employed from year 1999 to 
2012. We exclude borrowers that are in the financial services sector. However, the 
sample is unbalanced because of a lack of data in some years but since these gaps 
appear at random, they should not affect the estimation in any other way other than 
reducing the sample size (Wooldridge, 2009). All deals involve a single lender.  
All monetary values of variables are deflated by the CPI. In the sample, the highest 
and lowest real loan size is 0.26 Billion and 0.1 Million CNY respectively. The 
average lending maturity in loan rate limitation period is 1.53 year, while the value in 
loan rate liberalisation period is 1.54 year. Most deal durations (around 65%) are 
between 1-2 years in both periods. A higher proportion of collateralised loans are 
observed in post-2004 period (89.6%) than in pre-2004 period (68.3%). The average 
values of firms’ characteristics are unaltered between the “limited loan rate period” 
and “the loan rate liberalisation period” except for firm age. Firm ages are variation 
from 2 to 59 years12, with the mean of 8.71 during the pre-2004 period and 15.59 
during the post-2004 period. Two-thirds of firms have ages between 10-20 years. It 
can also be seen that average firm size increased slightly in the latter period. The 
                                                          
12Short firm age is caused by restructuring, mergers and acquisitions. 
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average cash flow ratio is positive, with the mean value of 4.12 during pre-2004 and 
3.39 during post-2004 respectively; while the average debt/asset ratio is 46.82 during 
pre-2004 and 48.24 during post-2004 respectively.  
As to bank ownership, there is a big performance gap between the SOBs and other 
banks in both periods. It can be seen that 63.3% of the loan deals are initiated with the 
SOBs of deals during the pre-2004 period; and the data decreased to 45.7% in the 
post-2004 period. Single bank-firm relationships are in the minority with 28.3% of 
deals during pre-2004 period and only 13% of deals during post-2004 period, but as 
expected the mass of loan deals are with SOEs (around 80% in both periods) and 
manufacturing companies count for most of the firms from 1999-2012. The value of 
HHI as a measure of market concentration, keep decreasing from 1068.50 in year 
1999 to 564.59 in year 2012, which may indicate an increasing competition in China 
banking market. Table 3below summarises the data. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the different time periods 
 Loan rate limitation period 1999-2004 Loan rate liberalisation period 2005-2012 
Variables Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Deal terms 
Ln(Loan size) 2200 18.212 1.247 13.726 24.079 4428 18.458 1.270 12.300 27.100 
Maturity of loan (years) 2218 1.526 2.211 0.080 13.020 4712 1.537 1.642 0.164 20.333 
Collateral 2221 0.683 0.465 0 1 4739 0.896 0.305 0 1 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Firm asset) 2228 21.391 0.836 18.403 24.464 4910 22.005 1.045 18.802 28.100 
Firm age 2228 8.714 4.817 2 48 4739 15.586 7.220 2 59 
Cash flow ratio 2115 4.123 7.364 -28.979 40.428 4705 3.386 8.412 -30.576 50.651 
Liquidity 2115 46.821 21.232 0.907 170.429 4705 48.243 18.324 1.347 146.515 
Bank ownership 
State-owned Banks 2228 0.633 0.481 0 1 4912 0.457 0.498 0 1 
Banking relationship 
Single  2228 0.283 0.450 0 1 4912 0.130 0.337 0 1 
Macro Terms 
HHI 2228 870.228 56.004 819.756 1068.500 4912 627.304 41.000 564.589 788.873 
Annual growth of GDP 2228 9.454 0.685 7.620 10.090 4912 10.080 1.416 7.654 14.166 
Industrial terms 
Manufacture 2228 0.426 0.495 0 1 4912 0.408 0.491 0 1 
Real estate 2228 0.202 0.401 0 1 4912 0.219 0.413 0 1 
Services 2228 0.110 0.313 0 1 4912 0.107 0.309 0 1 
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5.2 Empirical results 
The first set of regression results from SUR estimation is detailed below in Table 4. 
All data in the regression are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We treat each 
period as a different sample and for each period we run three SUR models. These 
results represent the base case as well as variants. The Breusch-Pagan test accepts the 
validity of cross-equation correlation of the errors which validates the assumption of 
both functions being a reduced form from the same model.  
A parameter stability test for the models 1-2 in Table 4 confirm that the 
firm-bank loan relationship changed after the introduction of the removal of the loan 
rate ceiling in 2004. Surprisingly Collateral appears to have a positive effect on loan 
maturity but has no effect on loan size. This suggests that collateral mitigates default 
risk allowing banks to increase loan maturity at the margin. From the regression 
results, it is also clear that the pattern of firm’s characteristics on loan terms is largely 
unchanged in the two periods but clearly there was a change in the impact. The results 
confirm our expectations. First, firm size is positively related to the size of loan and 
maturity. Large firms are usually more transparent and less risky. Second, older firms 
will have a known history but the results show that Firm age does not play a 
significant role. Third, the effect of the Liquidity of the firms has the effect of 
increasing loan size. This result supports the notion that financially leveraged firms 
are more likely to get a larger loan as a form of insurance. However, it is also the case 
that weak firms and fast-growing firms are most likely to have a high debt-asset ratio, 
so high financial leverage is not necessarily consistent with weak quality. It is also 
note-worthy that the Liquidity variable is associated with a decrease in the loan 
maturity, as shorter loan maturities can serve to mitigate the risk problems by banks. 
These results may reflect the existing risk management strategy of Chinese banks. 
Hence banks tend to satisfy a low liquidity firm’s loan requirement but with short 
maturity. Given that both weak firms and fast-growing firms will have a low liquidity 
ratio, this strategy will help the development of firms but effectively control the 
lending risk of banks. 
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Comparing the results of the two periods, we can see the differences in the 
impact of the cash flow ratio and ownership. Cash flow ratio has no significant 
relationship with loan size and maturity in the regulated loan rate period, but is 
associated with larger loans in the latter period. This implies that Chinese banks tend 
to offer more loans to high quality firms in the deregulated period, which is consistent 
with the finds of Chang et al. (2014). During the period of 1999-2004, when the 
state-owned banks dominated the market, ownership had no effect on maturity or size. 
However, during the loan rate liberalisation period, the SOBs are positively related to 
both loan size and maturity confirming the policy oriented status of its lending 
function. 
Market structure measured by HHI is positive and significant with loan size and 
maturity during the loan rate limitation period, suggesting that the more concentrated 
bank market dominated by SOBs led to more favourable lending terms. This result 
suggests that the concentrated market power of the big-5 SOBs in China was used to 
support loss-making social projects that the collusive behaviour associated with the 
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. Hence banks were less likely to consider 
risk control in a less competitive market. However, during the Loan rate liberalisation 
period, market structure has no effect on loan size but is positively associated with 
maturity which suggests a complex interaction of both demand and supply effects, but 
ownership comes into play in this period with SOBs offering better deal terms. The 
negative effect of GDP growth on loan size is easier to interpret as the effect of a 
contraction in supply through the quantitative controls (credit quotas and window 
guidance13) placed on bank lending in boom times.   
We find that manufacturing firms are associated with lower loan size in both 
periods. And real estate firms are associated with shorter loan maturity during the 
pre-2004 period, but comparatively longer loan maturity during 2004-2012, reflecting 
the change in lending pattern and the real estate boom of this period. 
                                                          
13"Window guidance" is a non-compulsory monetary policy tool employed by the PBOC in the form of 
advice to commercial banks to affect their lending behaviour, similar to the "moral suasion" method 
employed by the Bank of England to affect bank lending behaviour in the 1960s in the UK. 
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Table 4: The determinants of banks' lending behaviour during 1999-2012 (z statistics in parenthesis) 
Period Loan rate limitation period 1999-2004 Loan rate liberation period 2005-2012 
Model I II III I II III 
 Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) 
Deal Term    
Collateral 
-0.021 
(-0.431) 
0.014* 
(1.804) 
-0.008 
(-0.150) 
0.013* 
(1.731) 
-0.010 
(-0.202) 
0.012* 
(1.664) 
-0.012 
(-0.197) 
0.037* 
(1.776) 
-0.012 
（-0.198） 
0.039** 
(1.971) 
-0.013 
（-0.219） 
0.039** 
（1.963） 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Firm size) 
0.715*** 
(23.405) 
0.048*** 
(10.228) 
0.704*** 
(22.765) 
0.045*** 
(9.528) 
0.700*** 
(22.444) 
0.046*** 
(9.676) 
0.425*** 
(24.838) 
0.016*** 
(2.885) 
0.424*** 
(24.808) 
0.016*** 
(2.931) 
0.423*** 
(24.784) 
0.016*** 
(2.930) 
Ln(Firm age+1) 
-0.084 
(-1.435) 
-0.012 
(-1.158) 
-0.020 
(-0.358) 
-0.002 
(-0.254) 
-0.002 
(-0.026) 
-0.007 
(-0.766) 
0.056 
(1.233) 
0.034 
(0.930) 
0.050 
(1.086) 
0.027 
(0.783) 
0.044 
(0.969) 
0.026 
(0.744) 
Cash flow ratio 
-0.001 
(-0.714) 
0.0001 
(0.559) 
-0.0002 
(-0.296) 
0.0001 
(0.858) 
-0.0004 
(-0.422) 
0.0001 
(0.661) 
0.004** 
(2.401) 
-0.0003 
(-0.392) 
0.004** 
(2.354) 
-0.0003 
(-0.213) 
0.003** 
(1.968) 
-0.0002 
(-0.109) 
Liquidity 
0.003*** 
(3.944) 
-0.0003** 
(-2.490) 
0.002** 
(2.119) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.387) 
0.002** 
(2.389) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.462) 
0.003*** 
(3.442) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.612) 
0.003*** 
(3.494) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.649) 
0.003*** 
(3.483) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.642) 
Bank ownership    
State-owned banks   
-0.043 
(-0.842) 
0.010 
(0.741) 
-0.035 
(-0.690) 
0.009 
(0.675) 
  0.069** 
(1.984) 
0.118*** 
(10.062) 
0.070** 
(1.978) 
0.118*** 
(10.082) 
Macro terms    
HHI   
0.003*** 
(3.308) 
0.001*** 
(5.981) 
0.003*** 
(3.113) 
0.001*** 
(5.606) 
  -0.0001 
(-0.147) 
0.001*** 
(6.831) 
-0.0001 
(-0.196) 
0.001*** 
(6.823) 
Growth rate of GDP   
-0.198*** 
(-3.833) 
0.121 
(1.085) 
-0.197*** 
(3.742) 
0.105 
(0.903) 
  -0.045*** 
(-3.719) 
-0.009** 
(-2.269) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.718) 
-0.009** 
(-2.273) 
Industry    
Manufacture     -0.156*** -0.012     -0.074* -0.009 
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(-2.610) (-1.303) (-1.869) (-0.691) 
Real estate     
-0.134* 
(-1.872) 
-0.035*** 
(-3.193) 
    0.016 
(0.349) 
0.009** 
(2.273) 
Service     
-0.152* 
(-1.716) 
-0.017 
(-1.269) 
    -0.045 
(-0.767) 
-0.017 
(-0.892) 
C 
2.909*** 
(4.285) 
-0.658*** 
(-6.288) 
5.155*** 
(6.121) 
-0.379*** 
(-2.937) 
5.297*** 
(6.286) 
-0.369*** 
(-2.857) 
7.729*** 
(18.494) 
0.596*** 
(4.244) 
8.263*** 
(16.182) 
-0.042 
(-0.262) 
8.341*** 
(16.276) 
-0.023 
(-0.142) 
Observation 2065 2065 2065 4426 4426 4426 
R square 0.367 0.166 0.379 0.191 0.383 0.196 0.227 0.129 0.231 0.175 0.232 0.175 
Breusch-Pagan 
testChi2 
87.669 77.672 76.017 14.715 16.667 17.196 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chow test for 
parameter stability 
F(k, 6491) 
122.3*** 230.1*** 12.7*** 17.2*** 10.0*** 12.9***     
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; z statistics in parentheses. 
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We now dig deeper into the data to identify the impact of the single bank-firm 
relationship in the two periods. Table 5 and table 6 shows these results. We treat each 
period as a different sample and estimate two SUR models. During the loan rate 
regulation period, the results of model I show that firms benefit from larger loan size 
and longer maturity through single firm-banking relationships. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Bharath et al. (2009). Single bank-firm relationships 
are typically associated with relationship banking, which alleviates the asymmetric 
information problem and help firms to get better lending terms. However, in the loan 
rate liberalisation period (Table 6), the results of model I suggests that the effect of a 
single bank-firm relationship falls entirely on the maturity of a loan and not the size. 
This may be interpreted as a weakening of the traditional bond of relationship banking 
as more commercial imperatives began to take effect, but that banks continue to 
compete by using the maturity of the loan as a choice variable. It is clear that the 
above results generally support hypothesis 1. No matter in which period, firms with 
single banking relationship get better loan terms. 
We use an interaction term between SOB and Single bank-firm relationship to 
identify the joint-effect of these two factors. We find that SOBs provide longer 
maturity loans than others. Even during the loan rate regulation period when the 
lending behaviour of SOBs were no different to other banks, SOBs tended to give 
larger loans and longer durations through a single banking relationship. Firms 
maintaining closer ties with state-owned banks were more likely to benefit from better 
loan terms. Model Ⅳ of Tables 5 and 6, show the effect of the interaction of SOB, 
single banking relationship and collateral, which reconfirms the SOB and relationship 
banking bias in lending in the pre-liberalization period, but a weakening in the 
liberalization period as only maturity seems to be affected and not loan size. The 
above results support hypothesis 2. 
In model III of table 5, the joint variable single*Collateral has a significant 
positive effect on loan size and loan maturity, which supports the notion that firms 
with single banking relationship tends to get more favourable loan terms even with a 
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collateral condition. However, in the liberalization period (Table 6), this is only 
significant for loan maturity suggesting a weakening of the single firm-bank 
relationship effect. This result supports hypothesis 3. 
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Table 5: Relationship banking 1999-2004 
Period Loan rate limitation period 1999-2004 
Model I II III Ⅳ 
 Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) 
Bank-firm relationship 
Single 
0.486*** 
(8.894) 
0.081*** 
(9.717) 
      
State-owned 
banks*Single 
  
0.490*** 
(7.121) 
0.075*** 
(7.162) 
    
Deal term         
Collateral 
-0.012 
(-0.246) 
0.013* 
(1.840) 
-0.011 
(-0.219) 
0.014* 
(1.851) 
-0.106* 
(-1.898) 
-0.007 
(-0.919) 
-0.067 
(-1.249) 
-0.002 
(-0.316) 
Single*Collateral     
0.366*** 
(4.153) 
0.083*** 
(6.240) 
  
State-owned 
banks*Single 
*Collateral 
      
0.342*** 
(3.249) 
0.098*** 
(6.182) 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Firm size) 
0.698*** 
(23.000) 
0.045*** 
(9.672) 
0.696*** 
(22.761) 
0.044*** 
(9.494) 
0.697*** 
(22.543) 
0.044*** 
(9.463) 
0.692*** 
(22.349) 
0.043*** 
(9.203) 
Firm age 
-0.026 
(-0.491) 
-0.002 
(-0.270) 
-0.017 
(-0.318) 
-0.001 
(-0.099) 
-0.030 
(-0.551) 
-0.003 
(-0.362) 
-0.024 
(-0.436) 
-0.001 
(-0.165) 
Cash flow ratio 
-0.0003 
(-0.405) 
0.0001 
(0.796) 
-0.0005 
(-0.546) 
0.0001 
(0.650) 
-0.0003 
(-0.392) 
0.0001 
(0.746) 
-0.0003 
(-0.411) 
0.0001 
(0.664) 
Liquidity 
0.003*** 
(2.857) 
-0.0004*** 
(-2.687) 
0.002** 
(2.579) 
-0.0004*** 
(-2.976) 
0.002** 
(2.283) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.164) 
0.002** 
(2.221) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.208) 
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Bank ownership 
State-owned banks 
-0.043 
(-0.877) 
0.011 
(0.843) 
-0.170*** 
(-3.181) 
-0.005 
(-0.663) 
-0.040 
(-0.798) 
0.014 
(0.860) 
-0.074 
(-1.429) 
0.004 
(0.551) 
Macro terms 
HHI 
0.003*** 
(3.207) 
0.001*** 
(5.957) 
0.003** 
(3.378) 
0.001*** 
(6.100) 
0.003*** 
(3.286) 
0.001*** 
(5.988) 
0.003*** 
(3.438) 
0.001*** 
(6.263) 
Growth rate of GDP 
-0.147*** 
(-2.899) 
0.082 
(0.609) 
-0.180*** 
(-3.540) 
0.081 
(0.586) 
-0.187*** 
(-3.631) 
0.078 
(0.528) 
-0.197*** 
(-3.822) 
0.082 
(0.596) 
C 
4.651*** 
(5.599) 
-0.473*** 
(-3.745) 
5.124*** 
(6.142) 
-0.392*** 
(-3.075) 
5.214*** 
(6.190) 
-0.387*** 
(-3.028) 
5.412*** 
(6.414) 
-0.337*** 
(-2.640) 
Observation 2065 2065 2065 4426 
R square 0.308 0.139 0.398 0.218 0.383 0.211 0.381 0.211 
Breusch-Pagan 
testChi2 
50.088 60.114 67.969 70.000 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Z statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Relationship banking 2005-2012 
Period Loan rate liberation period 2005-2012 
Model I II III Ⅳ 
 Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) 
Bank-firm relationship 
Single 
0.069 
(1.326) 
0.032** 
(1.973) 
      
State-owned 
banks*Single 
  
0.109* 
(1.740) 
0.047** 
(2.014) 
    
Deal term         
Collateral 
-0.021 
(-0.348) 
0.043** 
(2.127) 
-0.011 
(-0.190) 
0.042** 
(2.061) 
-0.002 
(-0.038) 
0.033* 
(1.735) 
-0.012 
(-0.188) 
0.034* 
(1.676) 
Single*Collateral     
-0.073 
(-1.276) 
0.046** 
(2.445) 
  
State-owned 
banks*Single 
*Collateral 
      
-0.006 
(-0.083) 
0.068*** 
(2.728) 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Firm size) 
0.423*** 
(24.774) 
0.017*** 
(2.971) 
0.424*** 
(24.805) 
0.017*** 
(2.977) 
0.423*** 
(24.798) 
0.017*** 
(2.960) 
0.424*** 
(24.807) 
0.016*** 
(2.951) 
Firm age 
0.049 
(1.062) 
0.030 
(0.814) 
0.050 
(1.085) 
0.026 
(0.762) 
0.049 
(1.071) 
0.028 
(0.801) 
0.050 
(1.088) 
0.026 
(0.711) 
Cash flow ratio 
0.004** 
(2.298) 
-0.0003 
(-0.451) 
0.003** 
(1.975) 
-0.0003 
(-0.483) 
0.003** 
(1.992) 
-0.0002 
(-0.395) 
0.003** 
(1.952) 
-0.0004 
(-0.693) 
Liquidity 
0.003*** 
(3.421) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.552) 
0.003*** 
(3.495) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.498) 
0.003*** 
(3.405) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.476) 
0.003*** 
(3.482) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.469) 
28 
Bank ownership 
State-owned banks 
0.070** 
(1.979) 
0.117*** 
(10.016) 
0.067* 
(1.843) 
0.112*** 
(9.231) 
0.071** 
(1.990) 
0.116*** 
(9.967) 
0.070* 
(1.906) 
0.110*** 
(9.137) 
Macro terms 
HHI 
-0.0001 
(-0.105) 
0.001*** 
(6.583) 
-0.0001 
(-0.161) 
0.001*** 
(6.599) 
-0.0001 
(-0.095) 
0.001*** 
(6.522) 
-0.0001 
(-0.141) 
0.001*** 
(6.604) 
Growth rate of GDP 
-0.044*** 
(-3.608) 
-0.009** 
(-2.387) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.720) 
-0.010** 
(-2.392) 
-0.044*** 
(-3.594) 
-0.010** 
(-2.475) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.704) 
-0.010** 
(-2.453) 
C 
8.241*** 
(16.134) 
-0.024 
(-0.143) 
8.266*** 
(16.173) 
-0.018 
(-0.112) 
8.219*** 
(16.061) 
-0.005 
(-0.030) 
8.261*** 
(16.142) 
-0.003 
(-0.019) 
Observation 4426 4426 4426 4426 
R square 0.231 0.175 0.231 0.175 0.232 0.176 0.231 0.177 
Breusch-Pagan 
testChi2 
15.832 16.792 15.480 16.600 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Z statistics in parentheses. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have proposed a framework for understanding bank lending in an environment of 
limited loan rate differentiation between borrowers in China. The framework suggests 
that the choice variable used by banks to equilibrate the loan market is the maturity of 
the loan rather than the interest rate. The empirical results explain the effects of firm 
size, on loan deal size and maturity as well the impact of bank ownership and 
indebtedness of the firm. Collateral plays a weak part in the pre-liberalization period 
in determining the maturity of a loan but strengthens in the liberalization period.  
The results for the single firm-bank relationship which would typically be 
associated with relationship banking shows a change in impact and pattern between 
the two periods. The pre-liberalization period shows a stronger relationship for the 
single firm-bank relationship than in the liberalization period. This result holds true 
even allowing for the interaction of collateral and SOBs. The single firm-bank 
relationship in the liberalization period works to increase the maturity of the loan only 
suggesting a weakening of the single-relationship. The single firm-bank relationship 
is perhaps less important in the liberalization period as it is possible for firms to 
entertain a multiple bank-firm relationship with more than one SOB. However, the 
single firm-bank relationship continues to provide benefits in terms of improved 
maturity loans to firms. The results confirm the standard finding of a SOB bias in 
lending. 
 The results of the model are tentative and cannot be viewed as definitive and need 
to be revisited with continuous change and reforms to the Chinese banking market. It 
also goes without saying that continuing development of the Chinese banking system 
is such that any empirical results describing the past are likely to be superseded by the 
process of gradual but continuous change. However, given that reform in China’s 
banking system is gradual and not sudden, the results of this paper are indicative of 
recent trends in the lending behaviour of the banks. 
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Abstract 
China has partially liberalized loan rate setting by the banks since 2004 but loan rates 
remain stubbornly within narrow bounds. We argue that competition in the loan 
market is signalled through the variation of loan deal terms and loan maturity rather 
than loan rates. We examine the determinants of loan deal conditions in terms of size 
and maturity. This paper focuses on the role of single firm-bank relationships in 
determining loan deal conditions. Commercial loan deal terms of listed companies are 
matched to provider banks over the period 1999-2012 and sub-sample estimation for 
the pre-2004 and post-2004 periods confirm change in the bank-firm-loan 
relationship. We find that single firm-bank relationships are associated with larger 
loan size and longer loan maturity in the pre-liberalization period but that this 
relationship has weakened in the liberalization period.  
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1. Introduction 
Up until the late 1990s, the primary function of the Chinese banking sector was to 
provide low-cost funds to state-owned-enterprises (SOEs). Since the reform process 
signalled by the Banking Law of 1995, the banking sector has been gradually 
evolving towards full commercialisation. This gradual process has involved 
recapitalisation, foreign strategic investment, reformed governance, modern methods 
of risk management and limited liberalisation of loan rate setting. Up until 2004 
lending rates were strictly controlled within a narrow range by the Peoples Bank of 
China (PBOC). The legacy of the policy of strict control of lending rates along with 
policy directed lending was the under-pricing of risk and the well-known history of 
China’s non-performing loans (NPLs). After 2004 the upper limit on interest rates 
were lifted and banks had the capability to risk price marginal lending. 
 However, in the main, banks have not taken advantage of this new-found freedom 
and loan rates have remained clustered around the benchmark rate set by the PBOC. 
The reasons for the homogeneity of Chinese bank behaviour are uncertain. Podpiera 
(2006) surmises that interest rate pricing may have been a low priority in an 
environment of abundant liquidity or the familiar arguments of adverse selection and 
adverse incentives associated with the credit rationing literature (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). In an environment of limited loan rate differentiation, the terms and conditions 
of the loan that make up the vector of non-interest price factors can be expected to 
reflect risk and market conditions. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of terms and conditions 
of the bank loans of listed companies in China covering a data span 1999-2012. It 
argues that competition in the loan market is signalled through the variation in loan 
terms rather than the loan rate. We examine the determinants of loan deal conditions 
in terms of size and maturity of a commercial loan. We focus on the role of single 
firm-bank relationships. We match commercial loan deal terms of listed companies to 
provider banks over the period 1999-2012 and conduct sub-sample estimation for the 
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pre-2004 and post-2004 periods. Controlling for firm, bank ownership and market 
characteristics, we find that single firm-bank relationships generate better loan 
covenant in terms of longer loan maturity, but a single firm-bank relationship is not 
associated with larger loan size, allowing for other factors. We also investigate the 
single firm-bank relationship in the context of the ownership status of the bank and 
the firm. We find that state-owned banks (SOBs) are associated with larger loan deals 
and longer maturity.  
To anticipate the rest of our results we find that firm size and its debt exposure 
provide strong effects on loan maturity and loan size. The larger the firm measured by 
assets, the larger loan size and maturity of loans. The greater the debt exposure, the 
lower the loan size and the longer the maturity. On the supply characteristics, SOBs 
and single firm-bank-relationships (SBRs) are associated with longer maturity loan 
terms but have no clear relationship to loan size. Our results also confirm the 
well-known bias in lending by SOBs. A parameter stability test shows that the 
firm-bank loan relationship changed after 2004. 
This paper is organised along the following lines. The next section presents a 
brief context of Chinese banking. The third section offers the literature review. The 
fourth section outlines a theoretical framework and the empirical model. The fifth 
section examines the data and discusses the empirical results. The final section 
concludes. 
2. The Chinese banking context 
The remarkable growth of the Chinese economy and the development of her banking 
system continue to generate both plaudits and scepticism in almost equal amounts1. 
The use of the banking system for policy lending had saddled it with inefficiency and 
a large non-performing loans problem. Privatisation of a sort occurred with the 
creation of the joint-stock banks alongside the big-four SOBs, but the reality is that 
                                                          
1For example Coase and Wang (2012) compared with Huang (2008). 
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4 
government remains firmly in control2. Through the creation of asset management 
companies, the big four banks were recapitalised with the use of the dollar reserves 
prior to their listing. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial institutions could take a 
stake in selected Chinese banks. But, while control of individual Chinese banks 
remains out of reach for the foreign institution3, the pressure to reform management, 
consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and reduce unit costs has 
increased with greater foreign exposure. 
Studies of Chinese bank efficiency conclude that while large inefficiencies exist 
(Chen et al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2009), these inefficiencies are declining. The 
conventional finding is that the SOBs have a higher level of average inefficiency and 
a slower speed of inefficiency decline than the JSBs (Joint-stock commercial banks). 
Efficiency and performance is found to be related to risk management processes and 
the internal decision making of the banks, indicating a strong learning activity on the 
part of the banks to ‘up their game’ (Matthews, 2013). The listing of the big four 
banks in China is intended to improve management, governance, transparency and 
ultimately profit performance.  
 Despite clear improvements in performance and efficiency, the Chinese banking 
system remains dominated by the SOBs and its lending is largely directed to the 
SOEs. Firth et al. (2009) quote that despite the private sector accounts for 50% of the 
economy it is the recipient of only 7% of bank credit. The banking system is still 
constrained by political influence and directed lending. Anecdotal evidence provided 
by Dobson and Kashyap (2006) and quoted in Bailey et al. (2011) suggest that despite 
the substantial progress in reform, banks face considerable political pressure in their 
loan decisions. Yet the Chinese approach of gradualist reform continues at its pace. 
There has been limited reform of loan rate setting allowed by the Peoples Bank of 
                                                          
2The Joint Stock Banks, while not directly owned by the Chinese government are owned by SOEs 
and entities that are ultimately traced to SOEs or Provincial government.  
3There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single 
investor, except in the case of joint-venture banks. 
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5 
China (PBOC) and previous limits to interest rate setting have been lifted. Table 1 
shows the evolution of the regulation of interest rates for commercial banks. 
Table 1: Regulation of lending rates for commercial banks 
Year Loans Regulation 
1996 All enterprises: 0.9 to 1.1 times the official benchmark rate 
1998 Small enterprises 0.9 to 1.2 times the benchmark rate 
 Medium and large enterprises 0.9 to 1.1 times the benchmark rate 
1999 Small and Medium enterprises 0.9 to 1.3 times the benchmark rate 
 Large enterprises 0.9 to 1.1 times the benchmark rate 
2004 All enterprises 0.9 to 1.7 
2004 October  Upper limit removed. Lower limit unchanged 
2012 June Lower limit changed as 0.7times the benchmark rate 
2013 June Lower limit removed. 
Source: PBOC. 
Both anecdotal evidence and evidence in Podpiera (2006) suggest that despite the 
liberalisation of lending rates most new loans were contracted at or below the PBOC 
benchmark rate. Evidence by He and Wang (2012) confirm that even in 2010, over 
80% of bank loans were contracted in the bounds 0.9-1.3 of the benchmark rate at a 
time when the benchmark rate was at its lowest since liberalisation. Based on the 
survey data of 2400 enterprises for 2003, He (2010) makes an empirical study on 
firm-bank relationship and loan price in China. The results show that the length of 
firm-bank relationship has no significant effect on loan interest rate. The implication 
is that a single firm-bank relationship will be reflected in other aspects of the loan 
contract rather than the interest rate. 
The origin of the practice of limited loan rate differentiation may be traced to 
custom and practice, goodwill, legal constraints (such as usury laws), and institutional 
rigidities. Theoretical explanations are based on asymmetric information 
resulting in adverse selection and adverse incentives (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model results in an interest rate effect that has not only 
a direct positive effect on the bank’s return but also an indirect negative effect. This 
negative effect comes in two forms. First, the interest rate charged affects the riskiness of 
the loan, which is the adverse selection effect. Second, the higher the rate of interest 
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6 
charged, the greater the incentive is to take on riskier projects, which is the adverse 
incentive effect. While such explanations may explain limited loan rate differentiation 
post-2004 in Chinese banks, the structure and political economy of the banking system 
suggests that central direction remains a strong imperative for lending to SOEs on 
favourable terms (Zhang, 2013).  
Figure 1 shows that post-2004 after an initial widening, the variability of lending 
rates has degenerated. According to data from PBOC, around 80% of the loan rate are in 
the 0.9-1.3 times of benchmark interest rate range from 2004-2013, which shows that the 
loan rate are still limited even after the loan rate liberation in 2004. Even during the 
period from 2007-2011, the share of loans priced at 0.9-1.1 times the benchmark rate 
was 81.7%. 
Figure 1: Distribution of effective interest rate on loans. Source: PBOC database. 
There are several possible reasons for this. First, while the credit rationing 
arguments of Jaffe and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) can explain limited 
loan rate differentiation, but there is little suggestion that SOEs and listed companies in 
China face credit rationing (Zhang, 2013). Second, the banking market may have been 
trapped in a Nash equilibrium following deregulation, awaiting the market leader to be 
the first mover. Third, competition may have swiftly equalised lending rates.  
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7 
With such limited loan rate differentiation between banks, the question arises 
how do banks compete if the rate of interest is not used to price risk as expected 
following liberalisation? In this paper we propose that banks compete using the 
maturity of a loan4 as a choice variable in determining loan contracts. But first, we 
review the scope of relationship banking in China and briefly introduce how banks 
manage risk by adjusting loan size and maturity. 
3. Literature review  
In the Chinese banking market, SOBs have a closer relationship with state-owned 
enterprises based on both political imperative and political connections. Research on 
the banking relationship with non-financial firms has been a growing area of 
endeavour in China. Relationship banking plays an important role in resolving 
information problems and the benefits from strong banking relationships have been 
shown in many empirical studies (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al. 2008). 
The opacity of business in China, and information asymmetry are viewed by some as 
the key impact variables that define the lending relationship (Cao et al., 2010;Chang 
et al., 2014). The level of transparency of a firm is an important factor in banking 
relationships, where it is argued that the relationship bank can exploit its 
informational advantage to ‘lock-in’ the relationship firm (Gopalan et al., 2011). The 
avoidance of lock-in by firms leads to the development of multiple bank relationships, 
and the decision between a single versus a multiple bank relationships is the outcome 
of a trade-off between better loan terms in a single firm-bank relationship and 
flexibility in the provision of other bank services in a multiple bank-firm relationship.  
However, banks face costs in collecting information from non-relationship firms, 
which make it even harder for opaque firms to secure external funds (Ziane, 2003). 
                                                          
4The term of a loan is determined after consultation between the lender and the borrower 
according to the borrower’s production or business cycle, repayment capability, and the lender’s 
ability to provide funds. The term of a loan shall be stated clearly in the lending contract. 
Generally, the term of a loan for one’s own account shall not exceed ten years. Loans with a term 
exceeding 10 years shall be reported to the People’s Bank of China for a record. (See Lending 
General Provisions (PBOC, 28.06. 1996)).  
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Hence, firms that lack transparency has a higher likelihood in maintaining a single 
banking relationship (Berger et al., 2008). In the China context, He (2005) argues that  
commercial banks and firms tend to keep closer relationships in order to communicate 
information and enhance the efficiency of credit financing. However, a closer banking 
relationship also gives rise to the risk of ‘lock-in’. Using the 2003 NSSBF (National 
Survey of Small Business Finances) data, Chen (2008) examines the impact of 
banking relationship maturity on the repeated loan availability and loan cost, and 
finds that the longer the bank-firm relationship the higher the cost of credit. Based on 
survey data of 1186 SMEs in China, He and Wang (2009) study the impact of 
bank-firm relationship on the growth of firms and find that the longer the maturity and 
the greater the number of lending relationships, the slower the growth of firms. 
The role of SOBs in national lending strategies is well-established in the literature. 
Sapienza (2004) uses information on individual loan contracts in Italy to study the 
effects of state ownership on bank lending behaviour, showing that SOBs charge 
lower interest rate and mostly favour large firms and firms located in depressed areas. 
The parallel with China is clear. Domestic growth was mainly promoted by state 
policy banks and SOBs. Foreign banks are also observed to have higher efficiency to 
domestic banks (Berger et al., 2009). However, as newcomers to the China’s banking 
market, foreign banks remain in a weak position in sustaining closer banking 
relationships (Yin and Matthews, 2016).  
Bank lending can also signal poor subsequent performance reflected in stock 
market performance. Using the Chinese listed firm’s data from 1999 to 2004, Bailey 
et al. (2011) conduct an event analysis and find that poor financial performance and 
high managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan, and bank 
loan approval predicts poor subsequent borrower performance. However, it can be 
argued as with all studies on China the rapid development of China’s banking market 
makes all such studies time dependent. Unlike the past when the banking system was 
wedded to the socialist plan, Chinese commercial banks, in recent years have focussed 
on credit quality when making lending decisions (Chang et al., 2014). The average 
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non-performing loan ratio of the major commercial banks in China decreased from 
17.9% in 2003 to 0.9% in 20125. Modern credit risk management methods and risk 
pricing since 2004 has become standard practice (He and Wang, 2012). Loan quality 
is an important factor in the lending decision. Banks have also reduced their loan 
exposure to individual enterprises and widened the loan portfolio to more firms to 
diversify their risk (Yin and Matthews, 2017).  
The key factors in the lending contract are the size of the loan, loan maturity, 
interest rate and collateral. While risk is typically managed through the risk premium 
and collateral, (Berger and Udell, 1995; Ferri and Messori, 2000; Lehmann et al., 
2004) in practice, banks also use the loan covenant to control default risk. Although 
few studies have focussed on how asymmetric information and borrower’s risk affects 
the loan covenant, limiting the loan size and varying the maturity are part of the kit 
bag of risk management tools (Strahan, 1999; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; 
Kirschenmann and Norden, 2012). 
Using Dealscan data from 1988 to 1998, Stranhan (1999) finds that firms with a 
higher cash flow ratio or higher profitability (high quality firms) tend to secure larger 
loan size, while low rated firms face restricted loan volumes. Banks may also share 
the risk with their competitors by limiting the loan amount, in which low quality firms 
are forced to seek more banks for additional credit (Ferri and Messori, 2000). 
Similarly, loan maturity is also part of the bank’s risk management strategy. The 
liquidity constraints banks facing make a higher frequency of short term loans. And 
short maturities are supplied to more risky firms (Diamond, 1991). Berger et al. (2005) 
also show that decreasing asymmetric information is associated with an increase in 
loan maturities. Larger firm secure longer loan maturity since they are more 
transparent6 and usually low risk (too big to fall7), while less mature firms and firm 
                                                          
5See China banking regulatory commission annual report (year 2003-2012). 
6large firms are usually more transparent than small firms (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Stephan 
et al., 2012) 
7See Detragiache et al. (2000) 
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owners with poor credit histories tend to get shorter loan maturity (Ortiz-Molina and 
Penas, 2008).  
4. A Simple Model 
In this section we set out a simple model of bank market behaviour based on 
asymmetric information and guanxi which is the traditional business culture in China.  
For the firm, the objective is to obtain finance at the best terms possible which 
includes the longest maturity and most favourable repayment plan. As cash flow is 
important in the early stages of investment, we argue that the success of the project is 
positive in the uninterrupted access to loanable funds for the longest possible 
duration. The firm needs to borrow a minimum amount of funds L, from the bank to 
realise the project. Higher levels of loanable funds are used to obtain higher returns 
from the project. Let y be the total return generated from the investment for a given 
maturity of the loan.  
Loan activity by the banks is highly regulated in China by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC)8. A guanxi relationship with the bank will help the 
firm to manoeuvre around the restrictive regulations to ensure a smooth flow of 
funding. We denote the intensity of the guanxi relationship as G and other exogenous 
factors like firms’ characteristics that may affect the return on the project as X. Let the 
probability of success of the investment be given by ρ and the probability density 
function be given by 𝑓(𝜌) that describes the distribution of returns of the project. 
We assume that the objective of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the borrowing 
firm is to maximise the expected cash flow E(C)over the maturity of the loan. 
 
                                                          
8Loans are categorised by purpose with regulated duration of loans. Loans for working capital are 
typically of one-year duration, loans for fixed asset investment will typically be for 1-3 years, 
loans for projects depend on the nature of the project but will have to satisfy a raft of regulations 
before the loan application and loans for M&A is less than a year. 
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𝐸(𝐶) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜌)𝑑𝜌
𝑢
0
[𝑦(𝐿, 𝐺, 𝑋)] − (1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝐿       𝜇 ≥ 1 
𝐸(𝐶) = ?̅?(𝐿, 𝐺, 𝑋) − (1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝐿    (1) 
The assumptions are that bank credit is used to finance inputs to production in the 
sense of Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The expected value of the return on the 
investment by the firm is ?̅?.An increase in the borrowing level, increases the return 
from the investment but with diminishing returns. So 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐿
> 0; 
𝜕2?̅?
𝜕𝐿2
< 0; but also 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐺
>
0; where u is the upper limit of the return on a successful investment, r is the fixed 
rate of interest, and μ = maturity of loan. An interior solution exists for (1) on the 
condition 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐿
> (1 + 𝑟)𝜇. 
    It can be shown that (1) yields an iso-cash flow function that can be interpreted 
as a demand for loanable funds that is positive in µ and L and responds with an 
increase in µ for an increase in guanxi intensity.  
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐿
=
[
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐿
−(1+𝑟)𝜇]
𝜇(1+𝑟)𝜇−1
> 0 and 
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐺
=
[
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐺
]
𝜇(1+𝑟)𝜇−1
> 0 
From the perspective of the bank, it trades off increased risk from committing the 
loan to a longer maturity against the greater value of the guanxi relation. Let the value 
function for the banks be Vb, the bank’s perception of the probability of success be φ, 
which is a function of the term of the loan (given by µ). The nature of asymmetric 
information is that while the borrower is aware of the objective probability of the 
success of the investment the bank has a subjective probability of repayment which 
declines with the length the maturity of the loan. The amount of the loan is L, 
collateral is a fraction 0 <σ< 1 of the loan, and the gain from the guanxi relation G is 
such that the fraction of collateral posted declines with the increase in its intensity, 
𝜎(𝐺). The bank’s subjective assessment of the risk of the project increases with the 
term of the loan so 𝜑′ =  
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝜇
< 0 and 𝜎𝐺 =  
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝐺
< 0. 
The value function of the bank is; 
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𝑉𝑏 = (1 + 𝑟)
𝜇𝜑(𝜇)𝐿 + (1 − 𝜑(𝜇))(𝜎(𝐺)𝐿)        (2) 
𝜕𝑉𝑏
𝜕𝜇
= 𝜇(1 + 𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿 + (1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝜑′𝐿 − 𝜑′(𝜎𝐿) = 0  
= 𝜇(1 + 𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿 + 𝜑′((1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝐿 − (𝜎𝐿)) = 0  (3) 
    Clearly the above expression cannot be zero unless the second term is negative, 
which holds by assumption of the collateral condition. Totally differentiating (2) and 
setting to zero to derive an iso-value function for the bank; 
𝑑(𝑉𝑏) = [𝜑′{(1 + 𝑟)
𝜇𝐿 − 𝜎𝐿} +  𝜇(1 + 𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿]𝑑𝜇 + [(1 + 𝑟)𝜇𝜑 + (1 − 𝜑)𝜎]𝑑𝐿
+ (1 − 𝜑)𝜎𝐺𝑑𝐺 = 0 
    The first term in the square brackets is positive for values of µ less than the FOC 
of (3). Since the second term in the square brackets is positive, this results in; 
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐿
= −
[(1+𝑟)𝜇𝜑+(1−𝜑)𝜎]
𝜑′ {(1+𝑟)𝜇𝐿−𝜎𝐿}+ 𝜇(1+𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐺
= −
(1−𝜑)𝜎𝐺
𝜑′ {(1+𝑟)𝜇𝐿−𝜎𝐿}+ 𝜇(1+𝑟)𝜇−1𝜑𝐿
> 0 
    Equilibrium in loan size and duration is described in figure 2 showing a guanxi 
effect on loan size and duration. The firm’s iso-cost function is shown by D1. The 
bank’s iso-value function is shown by S1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2：Guanxi effect in the loan market 
D1 
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L 
S1 
S2 
guanxi effect 
D2 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
13 
In this framework, the rate of interest r is not seen as a choice variable in determining 
equilibrium in the loan market. An increase in intensity of guanxi shifts the supply 
curve up to the right and the demand curve up to the left(as shown in figure 2). The 
loan duration rises. However, the effect on loan size is ambiguous, which needs 
further testing. We have no direct measure of intensity of guanxi, but we posit that a 
single bank relationship is more consistent with it than a multiple bank relationship. 
Hence, the first hypothesis is: 
H1: In China’s banking market, firms with a single bank relationship will get more 
favourable loan terms. 
 
Previous studies suggest that SOBs have a special relationship with SOEs in China 
(Berger et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2012). The mitigation of loan risk when banks offer 
more favourable loan terms to specific firms is examined by Dong et al. (2014) who 
find that SOBs are better in controlling the NPL ratio than other types of Chinese 
banks in practice. Lu et al. (2012) highlight the collateral requirement for the “related 
loan” in China. There is a high probability that SOBs use collateral to secure guanxi 
loans. The following hypothesis relates to the joint effect of guanxi and collateral on 
loan terms. 
H2: The joint effect of a single banking relationship and collateral issued by SOBs is 
positively linked to loan terms. 
 
Although traditionally SOBs have been more involved in guanxi lending (Yin and 
Matthews, 2017), they have gradually moved towards commercial principles when 
making lending decisions (Firth et al., 2009). Unlike the unlisted period when the 
SOBs followed the dictates of the socialist plan, they have increasingly focussed on 
credit quality when making lending decisions (Chang et al., 2014). Furthermore 
competition in China’s banking market has intensified, while the interest rate still 
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varies in a small range, which implies the lending behaviours of SOBs have changed 
only gradually. The above analysis suggests that the guanxi effect weakened in the 
loan liberalisation period. Hence out third hypothesis is: 
H3: Compared with the limited loan rate period, the benefits of a single banking 
relationship are weaker in the loan liberalisation period. 
 
Other control variables [X] are: the size of the firm – it is posited that banks would 
make credit more easily available to large firms than small ones according to the 
information asymmetric theory. Also larger firms tend to have more bargaining power, 
which can make them secure more favourable loan terms (Harhoff and Körting, 1998; 
Stephan et al., 2012); a vector of firm-bank characteristics (firm quality, firm age); 
negative demand side characteristics (debt/asset ratio); and bank ownership.  
The two functions Loan and Maturity are to be interpreted as reduced form 
specifications and therefore SUR (seeming uncorrelated regression) method is chosen 
to deal with the empirical model. The Breusch-Pagan test is used to check the 
significant positive relationship between Loan 9 and Maturity. The benchmark 
empirical equation is designed as follow: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡+𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                            (4) 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                         (5) 
In equation (4) and (5), 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙10 is a dummy variable, which distinguishes the loan 
                                                          
9Loan size was deflated by CPI. 
10Collateral includes guaranteed loans, mortgage loans, and hypothecated loans. 
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deal with or without collateral, 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 stands for real firm size11, firm age and Cash 
flowratio are denoted as firmage andCashflows respectively, and liquidity stands for 
debt/asset ratio. In order to solve the potential endogeneity problem the lagged values 
of Tasset, cashflows and liquidity are used. Bankownership is a dummy variable, 
which distinguishes state-owned banks and foreign banks with other banks 
respectively. Macro variables include banking market competition ratio and growth 
ratio of real GDP. The details of variable definition are listed in Table 2 as follows: 
 
Table 2: Definition of the variables 
Variables Definition Unit 
Deal terms 
Size of loan The amount of money of each loan contract CNY 
Maturity of loan The maturity of each loan contract Year 
Collateral Loan deal with collateral=1, otherwise=0 - 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm asset Annual total asset of firm CNY 
Firm age The age of firm Year 
Cash flow ratio Firm’s annual net cash flow over total asset % 
Liquidity Firm’s total current liabilities over total asset % 
Bank ownership   
State-owned Banks state-owned banks=1, otherwise=0 - 
Banking relationship   
Single Single banking relationship =1, otherwise=0 - 
Macro Terms 
Banking market competition 
ratio 
(HHI) 
The sum of the squares of the market shares (percentage of 
banks’ assets over the total assets of the entire banking 
sector) of the five largest banks. 
- 
Annual growth of GDP 
(GGDP) 
Annual growth ratio of real GDP % 
Industry 
Manufacturea 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. Manufacture 
industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Real estateb 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. Real estate 
industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Servicec 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. Service 
industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
aManufacture: Manufacture industry 
bReal estate: Real estate industry 
cServices: Wholesale, retail, trades hotels and catering services industry 
                                                          
11Firm size was deflated by CPI. 
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5. Data and Empirical Results 
5.1 Data 
This research has a data set assembled from the CSMAR (China Stock Market 
Financial Statements) database, which contains information on listed firms’ 
borrowing behaviour, their individual balance sheet and income statements. We 
conduct two sets of estimation. One set covers the period pre-2004 and the other is 
post-2004. The argument is that in the pre-2004 period when loan rate differentiation 
was even more limited, maturity of the loan played an even bigger part in defining the 
conditions of a loan. Specifically, we refer to the 1999–2004 period as “limited loan 
rate period”, and the 2005–2012 period as “the loan rate liberalisation period”. 
Data on 716 firms with 7140 lending relationship are employed from year 1999 to 
2012. We exclude borrowers that are in the financial services sector. However, the 
sample is unbalanced because of a lack of data in some years but since these gaps 
appear at random, they should not affect the estimation in any other way other than 
reducing the sample size (Wooldridge, 2009). All deals involve a single lender.  
All monetary values of variables are deflated by the CPI. In the sample, the highest 
and lowest real loan size is 0.26 Billion and 0.1 Million CNY respectively. The 
average lending maturity in loan rate limitation period is 1.53 year, while the value in 
loan rate liberalisation period is 1.54 year. Most deal durations (around 65%) are 
between 1-2 years in both periods. A higher proportion of collateralised loans are 
observed in post-2004 period (89.6%) than in pre-2004 period (68.3%). The average 
values of firms’ characteristics are unaltered between the “limited loan rate period” 
and “the loan rate liberalisation period” except for firm age. Firm ages are variation 
from 2 to 59 years12, with the mean of 8.71 during the pre-2004 period and 15.59 
during the post-2004 period. Two-thirds of firms have ages between 10-20 years. It 
can also be seen that average firm size increased slightly in the latter period. The 
                                                          
12Short firm age is caused by restructuring, mergers and acquisitions. 
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average cash flow ratio is positive, with the mean value of 4.12 during pre-2004 and 
3.39 during post-2004 respectively; while the average debt/asset ratio is 46.82 during 
pre-2004 and 48.24 during post-2004 respectively.  
As to bank ownership, there is a big performance gap between the SOBs and other 
banks in both periods. It can be seen that 63.3% of the loan deals are initiated with the 
SOBs of deals during the pre-2004 period; and the data decreased to 45.7% in the 
post-2004 period. Single bank-firm relationships are in the minority with 28.3% of 
deals during pre-2004 period and only 13% of deals during post-2004 period, but as 
expected the mass of loan deals are with SOEs (around 80% in both periods) and 
manufacturing companies count for most of the firms from 1999-2012. The value of 
HHI as a measure of market concentration, keep decreasing from 1068.50 in year 
1999 to 564.59 in year 2012, which may indicate an increasing competition in China 
banking market. Table 3below summarises the data. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the different time periods 
 Loan rate limitation period 1999-2004 Loan rate liberalisation period 2005-2012 
Variables Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Deal terms 
Ln(Loan size) 2200 18.212 1.247 13.726 24.079 4428 18.458 1.270 12.300 27.100 
Maturity of loan (years) 2218 1.526 2.211 0.080 13.020 4712 1.537 1.642 0.164 20.333 
Collateral 2221 0.683 0.465 0 1 4739 0.896 0.305 0 1 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Firm asset) 2228 21.391 0.836 18.403 24.464 4910 22.005 1.045 18.802 28.100 
Firm age 2228 8.714 4.817 2 48 4739 15.586 7.220 2 59 
Cash flow ratio 2115 4.123 7.364 -28.979 40.428 4705 3.386 8.412 -30.576 50.651 
Liquidity 2115 46.821 21.232 0.907 170.429 4705 48.243 18.324 1.347 146.515 
Bank ownership 
State-owned Banks 2228 0.633 0.481 0 1 4912 0.457 0.498 0 1 
Banking relationship 
Single  2228 0.283 0.450 0 1 4912 0.130 0.337 0 1 
Macro Terms 
HHI 2228 870.228 56.004 819.756 1068.500 4912 627.304 41.000 564.589 788.873 
Annual growth of GDP 2228 9.454 0.685 7.620 10.090 4912 10.080 1.416 7.654 14.166 
Industrial terms 
Manufacture 2228 0.426 0.495 0 1 4912 0.408 0.491 0 1 
Real estate 2228 0.202 0.401 0 1 4912 0.219 0.413 0 1 
Services 2228 0.110 0.313 0 1 4912 0.107 0.309 0 1 
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5.2 Empirical results 
The first set of regression results from SUR estimation is detailed below in Table 4. 
All data in the regression are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We treat each 
period as a different sample and for each period we run three SUR models. These 
results represent the base case as well as variants. The Breusch-Pagan test accepts the 
validity of cross-equation correlation of the errors which validates the assumption of 
both functions being a reduced form from the same model.  
A parameter stability test for the models 1-2 in Table 4 confirm that the 
firm-bank loan relationship changed after the introduction of the removal of the loan 
rate ceiling in 2004. Surprisingly Collateral appears to have a positive effect on loan 
maturity but has no effect on loan size. This suggests that collateral mitigates default 
risk allowing banks to increase loan maturity at the margin. From the regression 
results, it is also clear that the pattern of firm’s characteristics on loan terms is largely 
unchanged in the two periods but clearly there was a change in the impact. The results 
confirm our expectations. First, firm size is positively related to the size of loan and 
maturity. Large firms are usually more transparent and less risky. Second, older firms 
will have a known history but the results show that Firm age does not play a 
significant role. Third, the effect of the Liquidity of the firms has the effect of 
increasing loan size. This result supports the notion that financially leveraged firms 
are more likely to get a larger loan as a form of insurance. However, it is also the case 
that weak firms and fast-growing firms are most likely to have a high debt-asset ratio, 
so high financial leverage is not necessarily consistent with weak quality. It is also 
note-worthy that the Liquidity variable is associated with a decrease in the loan 
maturity, as shorter loan maturities can serve to mitigate the risk problems by banks. 
These results may reflect the existing risk management strategy of Chinese banks. 
Hence banks tend to satisfy a low liquidity firm’s loan requirement but with short 
maturity. Given that both weak firms and fast-growing firms will have a low liquidity 
ratio, this strategy will help the development of firms but effectively control the 
lending risk of banks. 
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Comparing the results of the two periods, we can see the differences in the 
impact of the cash flow ratio and ownership. Cash flow ratio has no significant 
relationship with loan size and maturity in the regulated loan rate period, but is 
associated with larger loans in the latter period. This implies that Chinese banks tend 
to offer more loans to high quality firms in the deregulated period, which is consistent 
with the finds of Chang et al. (2014). During the period of 1999-2004, when the 
state-owned banks dominated the market, ownership had no effect on maturity or size. 
However, during the loan rate liberalisation period, the SOBs are positively related to 
both loan size and maturity confirming the policy oriented status of its lending 
function. 
Market structure measured by HHI is positive and significant with loan size and 
maturity during the loan rate limitation period, suggesting that the more concentrated 
bank market dominated by SOBs led to more favourable lending terms. This result 
suggests that the concentrated market power of the big-5 SOBs in China was used to 
support loss-making social projects that the collusive behaviour associated with the 
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. Hence banks were less likely to consider 
risk control in a less competitive market. However, during the Loan rate liberalisation 
period, market structure has no effect on loan size but is positively associated with 
maturity which suggests a complex interaction of both demand and supply effects, but 
ownership comes into play in this period with SOBs offering better deal terms. The 
negative effect of GDP growth on loan size is easier to interpret as the effect of a 
contraction in supply through the quantitative controls (credit quotas and window 
guidance13) placed on bank lending in boom times.   
We find that manufacturing firms are associated with lower loan size in both 
periods. And real estate firms are associated with shorter loan maturity during the 
pre-2004 period, but comparatively longer loan maturity during 2004-2012, reflecting 
the change in lending pattern and the real estate boom of this period. 
                                                          
13"Window guidance" is a non-compulsory monetary policy tool employed by the PBOC in the form of 
advice to commercial banks to affect their lending behaviour, similar to the "moral suasion" method 
employed by the Bank of England to affect bank lending behaviour in the 1960s in the UK. 
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Table 4: The determinants of banks' lending behaviour during 1999-2012 (z statistics in parenthesis) 
Period Loan rate limitation period 1999-2004 Loan rate liberation period 2005-2012 
Model I II III I II III 
 Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) 
Deal Term    
Collateral 
-0.021 
(-0.431) 
0.014* 
(1.804) 
-0.008 
(-0.150) 
0.013* 
(1.731) 
-0.010 
(-0.202) 
0.012* 
(1.664) 
-0.012 
(-0.197) 
0.037* 
(1.776) 
-0.012 
（-0.198） 
0.039** 
(1.971) 
-0.013 
（-0.219） 
0.039** 
（1.963） 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Firm size) 
0.715*** 
(23.405) 
0.048*** 
(10.228) 
0.704*** 
(22.765) 
0.045*** 
(9.528) 
0.700*** 
(22.444) 
0.046*** 
(9.676) 
0.425*** 
(24.838) 
0.016*** 
(2.885) 
0.424*** 
(24.808) 
0.016*** 
(2.931) 
0.423*** 
(24.784) 
0.016*** 
(2.930) 
Ln(Firm age+1) 
-0.084 
(-1.435) 
-0.012 
(-1.158) 
-0.020 
(-0.358) 
-0.002 
(-0.254) 
-0.002 
(-0.026) 
-0.007 
(-0.766) 
0.056 
(1.233) 
0.034 
(0.930) 
0.050 
(1.086) 
0.027 
(0.783) 
0.044 
(0.969) 
0.026 
(0.744) 
Cash flow ratio 
-0.001 
(-0.714) 
0.0001 
(0.559) 
-0.0002 
(-0.296) 
0.0001 
(0.858) 
-0.0004 
(-0.422) 
0.0001 
(0.661) 
0.004** 
(2.401) 
-0.0003 
(-0.392) 
0.004** 
(2.354) 
-0.0003 
(-0.213) 
0.003** 
(1.968) 
-0.0002 
(-0.109) 
Liquidity 
0.003*** 
(3.944) 
-0.0003** 
(-2.490) 
0.002** 
(2.119) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.387) 
0.002** 
(2.389) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.462) 
0.003*** 
(3.442) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.612) 
0.003*** 
(3.494) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.649) 
0.003*** 
(3.483) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.642) 
Bank ownership    
State-owned banks   
-0.043 
(-0.842) 
0.010 
(0.741) 
-0.035 
(-0.690) 
0.009 
(0.675) 
  0.069** 
(1.984) 
0.118*** 
(10.062) 
0.070** 
(1.978) 
0.118*** 
(10.082) 
Macro terms    
HHI   
0.003*** 
(3.308) 
0.001*** 
(5.981) 
0.003*** 
(3.113) 
0.001*** 
(5.606) 
  -0.0001 
(-0.147) 
0.001*** 
(6.831) 
-0.0001 
(-0.196) 
0.001*** 
(6.823) 
Growth rate of GDP   
-0.198*** 
(-3.833) 
0.121 
(1.085) 
-0.197*** 
(3.742) 
0.105 
(0.903) 
  -0.045*** 
(-3.719) 
-0.009** 
(-2.269) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.718) 
-0.009** 
(-2.273) 
Industry    
Manufacture     -0.156*** -0.012     -0.074* -0.009 
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(-2.610) (-1.303) (-1.869) (-0.691) 
Real estate     
-0.134* 
(-1.872) 
-0.035*** 
(-3.193) 
    0.016 
(0.349) 
0.009** 
(2.273) 
Service     
-0.152* 
(-1.716) 
-0.017 
(-1.269) 
    -0.045 
(-0.767) 
-0.017 
(-0.892) 
C 
2.909*** 
(4.285) 
-0.658*** 
(-6.288) 
5.155*** 
(6.121) 
-0.379*** 
(-2.937) 
5.297*** 
(6.286) 
-0.369*** 
(-2.857) 
7.729*** 
(18.494) 
0.596*** 
(4.244) 
8.263*** 
(16.182) 
-0.042 
(-0.262) 
8.341*** 
(16.276) 
-0.023 
(-0.142) 
Observation 2065 2065 2065 4426 4426 4426 
R square 0.367 0.166 0.379 0.191 0.383 0.196 0.227 0.129 0.231 0.175 0.232 0.175 
Breusch-Pagan 
testChi2 
87.669 77.672 76.017 14.715 16.667 17.196 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chow test for 
parameter stability 
F(k, 6491) 
122.3*** 230.1*** 12.7*** 17.2*** 10.0*** 12.9***     
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; z statistics in parentheses. 
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We now dig deeper into the data to identify the impact of the single bank-firm 
relationship in the two periods. Table 5 and table 6 shows these results. We treat each 
period as a different sample and estimate two SUR models. During the loan rate 
regulation period, the results of model I show that firms benefit from larger loan size 
and longer maturity through single firm-banking relationships. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Bharath et al. (2009). Single bank-firm relationships 
are typically associated with relationship banking, which alleviates the asymmetric 
information problem and help firms to get better lending terms. However, in the loan 
rate liberalisation period (Table 6), the results of model I suggests that the effect of a 
single bank-firm relationship falls entirely on the maturity of a loan and not the size. 
This may be interpreted as a weakening of the traditional bond of relationship banking 
as more commercial imperatives began to take effect, but that banks continue to 
compete by using the maturity of the loan as a choice variable. It is clear that the 
above results generally support hypothesis 1. No matter in which period, firms with 
single banking relationship get better loan terms. 
We use an interaction term between SOB and Single bank-firm relationship to 
identify the joint-effect of these two factors. We find that SOBs provide longer 
maturity loans than others. Even during the loan rate regulation period when the 
lending behaviour of SOBs were no different to other banks, SOBs tended to give 
larger loans and longer durations through a single banking relationship. Firms 
maintaining closer ties with state-owned banks were more likely to benefit from better 
loan terms. Model Ⅳ of Tables 5 and 6, show the effect of the interaction of SOB, 
single banking relationship and collateral, which reconfirms the SOB and relationship 
banking bias in lending in the pre-liberalization period, but a weakening in the 
liberalization period as only maturity seems to be affected and not loan size. The 
above results support hypothesis 2. 
In model III of table 5, the joint variable single*Collateral has a significant 
positive effect on loan size and loan maturity, which supports the notion that firms 
with single banking relationship tends to get more favourable loan terms even with a 
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collateral condition. However, in the liberalization period (Table 6), this is only 
significant for loan maturity suggesting a weakening of the single firm-bank 
relationship effect. This result supports hypothesis 3. 
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Table 5: Relationship banking 1999-2004 
Period Loan rate limitation period 1999-2004 
Model I II III Ⅳ 
 Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) 
Bank-firm relationship 
Single 
0.486*** 
(8.894) 
0.081*** 
(9.717) 
      
State-owned 
banks*Single 
  
0.490*** 
(7.121) 
0.075*** 
(7.162) 
    
Deal term         
Collateral 
-0.012 
(-0.246) 
0.013* 
(1.840) 
-0.011 
(-0.219) 
0.014* 
(1.851) 
-0.106* 
(-1.898) 
-0.007 
(-0.919) 
-0.067 
(-1.249) 
-0.002 
(-0.316) 
Single*Collateral     
0.366*** 
(4.153) 
0.083*** 
(6.240) 
  
State-owned 
banks*Single 
*Collateral 
      
0.342*** 
(3.249) 
0.098*** 
(6.182) 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Firm size) 
0.698*** 
(23.000) 
0.045*** 
(9.672) 
0.696*** 
(22.761) 
0.044*** 
(9.494) 
0.697*** 
(22.543) 
0.044*** 
(9.463) 
0.692*** 
(22.349) 
0.043*** 
(9.203) 
Firm age 
-0.026 
(-0.491) 
-0.002 
(-0.270) 
-0.017 
(-0.318) 
-0.001 
(-0.099) 
-0.030 
(-0.551) 
-0.003 
(-0.362) 
-0.024 
(-0.436) 
-0.001 
(-0.165) 
Cash flow ratio 
-0.0003 
(-0.405) 
0.0001 
(0.796) 
-0.0005 
(-0.546) 
0.0001 
(0.650) 
-0.0003 
(-0.392) 
0.0001 
(0.746) 
-0.0003 
(-0.411) 
0.0001 
(0.664) 
Liquidity 
0.003*** 
(2.857) 
-0.0004*** 
(-2.687) 
0.002** 
(2.579) 
-0.0004*** 
(-2.976) 
0.002** 
(2.283) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.164) 
0.002** 
(2.221) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.208) 
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Bank ownership 
State-owned banks 
-0.043 
(-0.877) 
0.011 
(0.843) 
-0.170*** 
(-3.181) 
-0.005 
(-0.663) 
-0.040 
(-0.798) 
0.014 
(0.860) 
-0.074 
(-1.429) 
0.004 
(0.551) 
Macro terms 
HHI 
0.003*** 
(3.207) 
0.001*** 
(5.957) 
0.003** 
(3.378) 
0.001*** 
(6.100) 
0.003*** 
(3.286) 
0.001*** 
(5.988) 
0.003*** 
(3.438) 
0.001*** 
(6.263) 
Growth rate of GDP 
-0.147*** 
(-2.899) 
0.082 
(0.609) 
-0.180*** 
(-3.540) 
0.081 
(0.586) 
-0.187*** 
(-3.631) 
0.078 
(0.528) 
-0.197*** 
(-3.822) 
0.082 
(0.596) 
C 
4.651*** 
(5.599) 
-0.473*** 
(-3.745) 
5.124*** 
(6.142) 
-0.392*** 
(-3.075) 
5.214*** 
(6.190) 
-0.387*** 
(-3.028) 
5.412*** 
(6.414) 
-0.337*** 
(-2.640) 
Observation 2065 2065 2065 4426 
R square 0.308 0.139 0.398 0.218 0.383 0.211 0.381 0.211 
Breusch-Pagan 
testChi2 
50.088 60.114 67.969 70.000 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Z statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Relationship banking 2005-2012 
Period Loan rate liberation period 2005-2012 
Model I II III Ⅳ 
 Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) Ln(loan) Ln(1+dur) 
Bank-firm relationship 
Single 
0.069 
(1.326) 
0.032** 
(1.973) 
      
State-owned 
banks*Single 
  
0.109* 
(1.740) 
0.047** 
(2.014) 
    
Deal term         
Collateral 
-0.021 
(-0.348) 
0.043** 
(2.127) 
-0.011 
(-0.190) 
0.042** 
(2.061) 
-0.002 
(-0.038) 
0.033* 
(1.735) 
-0.012 
(-0.188) 
0.034* 
(1.676) 
Single*Collateral     
-0.073 
(-1.276) 
0.046** 
(2.445) 
  
State-owned 
banks*Single 
*Collateral 
      
-0.006 
(-0.083) 
0.068*** 
(2.728) 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Firm size) 
0.423*** 
(24.774) 
0.017*** 
(2.971) 
0.424*** 
(24.805) 
0.017*** 
(2.977) 
0.423*** 
(24.798) 
0.017*** 
(2.960) 
0.424*** 
(24.807) 
0.016*** 
(2.951) 
Firm age 
0.049 
(1.062) 
0.030 
(0.814) 
0.050 
(1.085) 
0.026 
(0.762) 
0.049 
(1.071) 
0.028 
(0.801) 
0.050 
(1.088) 
0.026 
(0.711) 
Cash flow ratio 
0.004** 
(2.298) 
-0.0003 
(-0.451) 
0.003** 
(1.975) 
-0.0003 
(-0.483) 
0.003** 
(1.992) 
-0.0002 
(-0.395) 
0.003** 
(1.952) 
-0.0004 
(-0.693) 
Liquidity 
0.003*** 
(3.421) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.552) 
0.003*** 
(3.495) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.498) 
0.003*** 
(3.405) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.476) 
0.003*** 
(3.482) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.469) 
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Bank ownership 
State-owned banks 
0.070** 
(1.979) 
0.117*** 
(10.016) 
0.067* 
(1.843) 
0.112*** 
(9.231) 
0.071** 
(1.990) 
0.116*** 
(9.967) 
0.070* 
(1.906) 
0.110*** 
(9.137) 
Macro terms 
HHI 
-0.0001 
(-0.105) 
0.001*** 
(6.583) 
-0.0001 
(-0.161) 
0.001*** 
(6.599) 
-0.0001 
(-0.095) 
0.001*** 
(6.522) 
-0.0001 
(-0.141) 
0.001*** 
(6.604) 
Growth rate of GDP 
-0.044*** 
(-3.608) 
-0.009** 
(-2.387) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.720) 
-0.010** 
(-2.392) 
-0.044*** 
(-3.594) 
-0.010** 
(-2.475) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.704) 
-0.010** 
(-2.453) 
C 
8.241*** 
(16.134) 
-0.024 
(-0.143) 
8.266*** 
(16.173) 
-0.018 
(-0.112) 
8.219*** 
(16.061) 
-0.005 
(-0.030) 
8.261*** 
(16.142) 
-0.003 
(-0.019) 
Observation 4426 4426 4426 4426 
R square 0.231 0.175 0.231 0.175 0.232 0.176 0.231 0.177 
Breusch-Pagan 
testChi2 
15.832 16.792 15.480 16.600 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Z statistics in parentheses. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have proposed a framework for understanding bank lending in an environment of 
limited loan rate differentiation between borrowers in China. The framework suggests 
that the choice variable used by banks to equilibrate the loan market is the maturity of 
the loan rather than the interest rate. The empirical results explain the effects of firm 
size, on loan deal size and maturity as well the impact of bank ownership and 
indebtedness of the firm. Collateral plays a weak part in the pre-liberalization period 
in determining the maturity of a loan but strengthens in the liberalization period.  
The results for the single firm-bank relationship which would typically be 
associated with relationship banking shows a change in impact and pattern between 
the two periods. The pre-liberalization period shows a stronger relationship for the 
single firm-bank relationship than in the liberalization period. This result holds true 
even allowing for the interaction of collateral and SOBs. The single firm-bank 
relationship in the liberalization period works to increase the maturity of the loan only 
suggesting a weakening of the single-relationship. The single firm-bank relationship 
is perhaps less important in the liberalization period as it is possible for firms to 
entertain a multiple bank-firm relationship with more than one SOB. However, the 
single firm-bank relationship continues to provide benefits in terms of improved 
maturity loans to firms. The results confirm the standard finding of a SOB bias in 
lending. 
 The results of the model are tentative and cannot be viewed as definitive and need 
to be revisited with continuous change and reforms to the Chinese banking market. It 
also goes without saying that continuing development of the Chinese banking system 
is such that any empirical results describing the past are likely to be superseded by the 
process of gradual but continuous change. However, given that reform in China’s 
banking system is gradual and not sudden, the results of this paper are indicative of 
recent trends in the lending behaviour of the banks. 
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